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Abstract 
This article will examine and evaluate the potential threat of maritime terrorism in 
Africa, in particular the threat posed at present off the Somali coast. Africa’s porous 
borders have provided an ideal conduit for the export of terrorism on land, and now 
its unguarded coastlines are a potential new thoroughfare for maritime terrorists to 
operate at sea. In Africa, the threat to maritime security and the proliferating threat 
of ungoverned spaces have lethally combined to spawn the major threat of piracy 
and now also the potential threat of maritime terrorism off the insecure coastline of 
Somalia. At the time of writing, the security threats and challenges posed by the 
rapid proliferation of piracy remains, and have continued to be so throughout 2009. 
As of recent, maritime experts observe that the waters off the coast of Somalia and 
the Gulf of Aden have emerged as the most dangerous zones for seafarers.   
Introduction  
As the end of the first decade of the 21st century fast approaches, it can rightly 
be asserted that transnational security challenges and threats have arguably 
dominated, shaped, influenced and adversely affected the stability of the global 
political landscape, particularly on the African continent.  
New threats cannot be readily defeated by the traditional defences that states 
have erected to protect their territories and their citizenry. The geopolitical 
 44 
landscape has been altered radically and few of today’s dangers have the character 
of overt military aggression, stemming from a clearly defined sovereign source.1  
The world’s vast maritime realm has become particularly conducive to the rising 
tide of such threats. Covering more than 130 million square miles of the earth’s 
surface, most of the world’s maritime environment takes the form of vast expanses 
of high seas, beyond the jurisdiction of any one particular state, with the implication, 
that by definition this realm is considered anarchic.2  
Growing attention is being accorded to the concept and phenomenon of so-
called “ungoverned spaces” and the potential link with the growth and prevalence of 
extremist and terrorist networks who exploit the presence of such areas in which 
terrorists can establish training grounds, recruitment zones and potential areas from 
which to stage operations. Ungoverned spaces are viewed as social, political and 
economic arenas where states do not exercise “effective sovereignty”, or where state 
control is absent, weak or contested.3 The RAND Corporation defines ungoverned 
space as “the territory of failed and failing states and areas within otherwise 
minimally functioning states where governance is absent.4  Ungoverned territories 
can be failed or failing states, poorly controlled land or maritime borders or airspace, 
or areas within otherwise viable states where the central government’s authority 
does not extend. Ungoverned territories can thus be found along a continuum of 
state control. At the benign end of the continuum are relatively healthy states that 
have lost control of some geographic or functional space within their territories.5 At 
the other end are failed states, in which the institutions of the central government are 
so weak that they cannot maintain authority or political order beyond the major 
cities and sometimes this control is also absent. The hierarchy of threats generated 
by ungoverned territories include ungoverned territories that harbour terrorists 
                                                          
1 Greenberg, M.D., Chalk, P., Willis, H.H., Khilko, I. & Ortiz, D.S. (2006). 
Maritime terrorism: Risk and liability. Arlington, VA: RAND Center for Terrorism 
Risk Management Policy, p. 1. 
2 Ibid., p. 2.  
3 Clunan, A. & Trinkunas, H. (2007). Conceptualizing “ungoverned spaces”: 
Territorial statehood, contested authority and softened sovereignty. Paper presented 
at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Naval 
Postgraduate School, Chicago, 30 August–2 September.   
4 RAND International Security and Defence Policy Center. (2005). Dealing with 
failed states and ungoverned spaces. Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation. 
5 Rabasa, A. & Peters, J.E. (2007). Dimensions of ungovernability. In A. Rabasa, S. 
Boraz, P. Chalk, K. Cragin, T.W. Karasik, J.D.P. Moroney, K.A. O’ Brien & J.E. 
Peters  (eds.). Ungoverned territories: Understanding and reducing terrorism risks. 
Arlington, VA: RAND Project Air Force, pp.7-12.  
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affiliated, associated or inspired by Al-Qaeda – known as the “global jihadist 
movement” – as well as areas containing terrorists, insurgent forces, or criminal 
networks that, while not part of the global jihadist movement, nevertheless pose a 
threat to the security of various countries.6  
The presence of armed groups outside the state’s control is a primary indicator 
of the extent to which a territory is ungoverned. To the extent that these groups are 
successful, they also displace state and government institutions – usually weak – to 
start within the areas where they establish a foothold. Unchecked, illegal armed 
groups will expand their resource base, increase their recruiting pool, and generate 
greater capacity at the expense of the state. Such groups also threaten individual 
citizens, requiring them to pay “taxes” or protection money or compelling them to 
participate in illegal activities. The presence of criminal networks also represents an 
intrusion on the state’s monopoly over the legitimate use of force. In numerous 
cases, terrorist or insurgent groups develop opportunistic alliances with these 
networks. Borders, where the majority of ungoverned territories are found, are the 
areas where the state is least likely to exercise effective monopoly on the use of 
force or full or comprehensive control of this territory.  
This article will propose that the world’s oceans, coastlines and strategic 
shipping lanes should be included in this definition as well. The article will 
furthermore posit that such ungoverned maritime spaces could potentially provide 
fertile ground for a wave of naval jihad to thrive in the near future. In Africa, certain 
stretches of the maritime environment are increasingly insecure and a prime example 
of ungoverned spaces that, in the near future, could very well be more effectively 
exploited by maritime terrorists.  
Over the past six years, there has been a modest yet highly discernible spike in 
high-profile terrorist attacks and plots at sea. The bombing of the USS Cole in the 
port of Aden, Yemen in 2000, (killing 17 US sailors and wounding 39) and the 
bombing of the French oil tanker, MV Limburg in 2002 raised concerns over the 
increasing threat posed by maritime terrorism. Furthermore, the Abu Sayyaf Group, 
Islamist separatists based in the Philippines and with links to Al-Qaeda, appears to 
have been responsible for the bombing of the Philippine vessel, Superferry 14 in 
2004.7 Maritime terror plots targeting areas of concentrated shipping such as the 
Straits of Gibraltar were also uncovered where, in 2002, Al-Qaeda operatives 
                                                          
6 Ibid.  
7 Council on Foreign Relations. (2005). Backgrounder: Abu Sayyaf Group, 
November. Available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/9235/ (Accessed 12 August 
2009).  
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reportedly plotted to attack US and British warships, and possibly commercial 
vessels. The Straits of Malacca in Southeast Asia has been another location 
frequently identified by security analysts as a potential locus of maritime terrorism 
activity.8 In 2001, Jemaah Islamiyah terrorists reportedly planned attacks on US 
navy vessels visiting the region.  
The only rebel group with a substantial designated naval wing is the Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelan (LTTE), better known as the Tamil Tigers. In 1984, the LTTE 
established a naval wing, the Sea Tigers, which included speedboats as well as larger 
vessels, including “phantom” or “ghost” ships, and armed scuba divers, who have 
attacked both vessels belonging to the Sri Lankan navy, including a passenger ferry 
operated by the navy, and at least one merchant ship. The total strength of the Sea 
Tigers is usually estimated at around two thousand and 100–200 suicide cadres in 
the so-called “Black Sea Tigers”.9 In 2006, it was engaged in one of the bloodiest 
naval engagements, killing 17 Sri Lankan sailors and 50 Tamil rebels.    
These various incidents have galvanised fears in the West that terrorists, 
especially militants connected with the international jihadist network, are moving to 
decisively extend operational mandates beyond purely territorially bounded 
theatres.10 For long, piracy has been a problem largely associated with the Malacca 
Straits between Indonesia and Malaysia, but it is now a growing issue for fragile 
African states.11 Africa’s porous borders have provided an ideal conduit for the 
export of terrorism on land, and now its unguarded coastlines are a potential new 
thoroughfare for maritime terrorists to operate at sea.  
In Africa, the threat to maritime security and the proliferating threat of 
ungoverned spaces have lethally combined to spawn the major threat of piracy and 
now also the potential threat of maritime terrorism off the insecure coastline of 
Somalia. Somalia remains a failed state governed by a failing government, entering 
                                                          
8 Parfomak, P.W. & Frittelli, J. (2007). Maritime security: Potential terrorist attacks 
and protection priorities. CRS Report for Congress, 14 May. USA: Congressional 
Research Service. Available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL33787.pdf 
(Accessed 12 August 2009).  
9 Møller, B. (2009). Piracy, maritime terrorism and naval strategy. DIIS Report 
2009, Number 2. Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, pp.6-30.  
10 Chalk, P. (2008). The maritime dimension of international security: Terrorism, 
piracy, and challenges for the United States. RAND Project Air Force. Arlington, 
VA: The RAND Corporation. Available at http://www.rand.org (Accessed 13 April 
2009). 
11 Middleton, R. (2008). Piracy in Somalia: Threatening global trade, feeding local 
wars. Chatham House Briefing Paper, Africa Programme, October 2008.  
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yet another turbulent and ominous phase in its tumultuous history. The Somali crisis 
rapidly deteriorated following the Black Hawk Down incident of 1993 in 
Mogadishu.12 Since then, virtually every sphere of Somali society has been affected 
by the continuing instability. At the time of writing, the security threats and 
challenges posed by the rapid proliferation of piracy remains, and have continued to 
be so throughout 2009. As of recent, maritime experts observe that the waters off the 
coast of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden have emerged as the most dangerous zones 
for seafarers.  
Another important observation by Middleton is that piracy has been a problem in 
Somali waters for at least ten years. Although piracy is therefore not considered a 
new phenomenon, the number of attempted and successful attacks has substantially 
risen over the last three years. The only period during which piracy ceased around 
Somalia was during the six months of rule by the Islamic Courts Union in the 
second half of 2006. The main argument held forth in this context is that an effective 
and functioning Somali Government should be capable of controlling piracy 
effectively. After the routing of the courts, piracy re-emerged and subsequently 
spiralled out of control. Somali hijackers for instance attacked more than 130 
merchant ships off Somalia in 2008 (including the Sirius Star, a Dubai-based super 
tanker carrying 2 million barrels of oil), a staggering rise of more than 200% on 
attacks carried out in 2007.13 In one such reported incident that occurred in August 
2008, a record number of four vessels were seized in just 48 hours.14 During the first 
week of December 2008, reports also emerged of a surprise attack on the nearly 600-
                                                          
12 The battle that occurred under the auspices of Operation Gothic Serpent was 
fought on 3 and 4 October 1993 in Mogadishu, Somalia by forces of the United 
States supported by UNOSOM II against Somali militia fighters loyal to warlord 
Mohamed Farah Aideed, with the support from armed civilian fighters. During this 
particular operation, two US UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters were shot down by 
rocket-propelled grenades. In all, 18 US soldiers were killed and another 84 
wounded in a 17-hour battle. Under pressure President Bill Clinton, announced the 
end of direct US involvement in Somalia only three days later. By April 1994, the 
last American troops were withdrawn.   
13 IMB Piracy Reporting Centre. (2009). IMB reports unprecedented rise in 
maritime hijackings, 16 January. Available at http://www.icc-ccs.org (Accessed 29 
August 2009).  
14 Wallis, D. (2008). Somali pirates a growing threat to shipping. Mail & Guardian, 
29 August. Available at http://www.mg.co.za/article/2008-08-29-somali-pirates-a-
growing-threat-to-shipping (Accessed 12 August 2009).   
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foot long luxury cruise liner M/S Nautica in the Gulf of Aden.15 During the assault 
on the cruise liner, pirates fired eight rifle shots at the ship, according to its operator, 
Oceania Cruises, Inc. Of even greater concern is that luxury cruise liners could 
resort to “maritime vigilantism” to ward off potential attackers, thereby endangering 
passenger security and through such hostile resistance, could increase the risk of a 
futile attack.16  
Figures released by the International Maritime Bureau’s Piracy Reporting Centre 
showed that pirate attacks off Somalia jumped tenfold in the first three months of 
2009 compared to a year ago (2008), and represented an increase from 6 to 61 
attacks.17 At the start of April 2009, pirates had gone on the offensive, seizing five 
ships in less than 48 hours, clearly undeterred by the presence of an international 
naval task force patrolling the Gulf of Aden.18 The attempted hijacking of the 
Maersk Alabama on 8 April 2009 was also the first act of piracy against a US vessel 
in nearly 200 years.19  
                                                          
15 Abbot, S. (2008). Cruise ship passengers surprised by pirate attack. CNN, 30 
November. Also see International Herald Tribune (2008). Cruise ship passengers 
recount pirate attack, 3 December.  
16 An Italian cruise ship, the MSC Melody, for instance used guns and a fire hose to 
beat off an attack by pirates off the east African coast towards the end of April 2009. 
The ship came under attack and was repeatedly fired upon and incurred slight 
damage, when it was 200 miles (320 km) north of the Seychelles and 600 miles (960 
km) off the Somali coast.  
17 Asia piracy down, as scourge hits Africa. (2009). Mail & Guardian, 23 April. 
Available at http://www.mg.co.za/article/2009-04-23-asia-piracy-down-as-scourge-
hits-africa (Accessed 12 August 2009).   
18 In January 2009, The Commander of Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) 
established Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151) specifically for counter-piracy 
operations in and around the Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea, Indian Ocean and the Red 
Sea. The force will utilise naval ships and assets from more than 20 nations. Task 
Force 151 is an outgrowth of Combined Task Force-150, which was created to 
conduct security operations at the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom in 
support of US operations in Afghanistan.  
19 See Gilpin, R. (2009) On the issues: Somalia, April. Available at 
http://www.usip.org/resources/issues-somalia (Accessed 29 August 2009). The 
vessel was sailing from Djibouti to Mombasa with a cargo of food aid destined for 
Somalia and Uganda when it was attacked. The vessel’s captain, Richard Phillips 
apparently volunteered to get in the lifeboat with the pirates, acting as a hostage for 
the Alabama’s 20 American crew members, who retook control of the ship after a 
confrontation 500 km off the coast of Somalia. The American captain was 
subsequently rescued, after US Navy SEAL snipers shot and killed three of his four 
captors, while another pirate was taken into custody.  
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While expanding the profile of their targets, pirates have now also begun to 
expand the geographic location of their activities and are increasingly pursuing 
vessels further out at sea and Kenyan seafarers are describing the current 
developments as a “pirate surge”.20 At the beginning of April 2009, Somali pirates 
had seized ships from France, Britain, Germany, Taiwan and Yemen by prowling 
further out in the Indian Ocean. Of particular concern was the hijacking of a 
Taiwanese fishing vessel, the MV Winfar 161, and its 29 crew members near the 
Seychelles’s exclusive economic zone, north of Denis Island.21  
Despite a vast international naval presence (consisting of 30 warships and 
aircraft from 16 nations, including members of NATO and the European Union) this 
critical geopolitical space is still vulnerable to potential exploitation by maritime 
terrorists. This raises the spectre of the maritime terror threat and could open 
avenues of potential collaboration with Somali pirates who have proved themselves 
ready to engage vastly superior military forces in a frustrating cat-and-mouse game 
on the open seas. There has been scepticism of the nexus between piracy and 
terrorism – where piracy is seen to thrive off an active and prosperous global 
shipping industry and terrorists are assumed to be seeking the destruction of the 
global maritime trade network as part of their self-defined economic war against the 
West.22 
This article will briefly assess the latest developments off the Somali coast and 
will explore the likelihood of maritime terrorism emerging as an additional threat 
alongside Somalia’s already pirate-infested territorial waters, further altering the 
nature of the terrorist threat facing the international community in Africa. The article 
will further seek to propose the need to view piracy in Somalia as more than the 
execution of a simple criminal act aimed at mere self-enrichment and financial gain. 
Instead, serious consideration should be accorded to the possible future role of 
Somali piracy in providing lucrative financial resources and possible materiel 
support in facilitating and supporting a wider jihad being waged by engaging in its 
own distinct form of maritime terrorism that is known as Al-Jihad bi-al-Mal-
Financial Jihad.  
 
                                                          
20 Chick, K. (2009). Piracy surge off Somali coast. The Christian Science Monitor, 7 
April. Available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2009/0407/p99s01-duts.html 
(Accessed 16 April 2009).  
21 Mojon, J-M. (2009). Somali pirates on hijacking spree. Mail & Guardian, 6 April. 
Available at http://www.mg.co.za/article/2009-04-06-somali-pirates-on-hijacking-
spree (Accessed 29 August 2009).  
22 Chalk op. cit., p. 31. 
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Tracking trends in Somali piracy 
The International Maritime Bureau defines piracy and armed robbery as “an act 
of boarding or attempting to board any ship with the apparent intent to commit theft 
or any other crime and with the apparent intent or capability to use force in the 
furtherance of that act.” This definition now also covers actual or attempted attacks, 
whether the ship is berthed, anchored or at sea.23 
“Maritime terrorism” refers to the undertaking of terrorist acts and activities 
within the maritime environment, using or against vessels or fixed platforms at sea 
or in port, or against any one of their passengers or personnel, against coastal 
facilities or settlements, including tourist resorts, port areas and port towns or 
cities.24 Some analysts contend that piracy could be and should be considered as a 
new form of terrorism. The similarities and overlaps between the two crimes have 
prompted some jurists and legal analysts to advocate abandoning the term “piracy” 
altogether in favour of “maritime terrorism”.25 
There had been a dramatic increase in the number of incidents reported by the 
International Maritime Bureau’s Piracy Reporting Centre in 2009. As of 15 July 
2009, piracy attacks around the world more than doubled to 240 from approximately 
114 during the first six months of the year compared with the same period in 2008. 
As in the last quarterly report, the rise in overall numbers has been attributed to 
increased Somali pirate activity off the Gulf of Aden and east coast of Somalia, with 
86 and 44 incidents reported respectively.26 A total of 78 vessels were boarded 
worldwide, 75 vessels fired upon and 31 vessels hijacked with some 561 crew 
members taken hostage, 19 injured, seven kidnapped, six killed and eight missing. 
The attackers were heavily armed with guns and knives in the majority of incidents 
                                                          
23 ICC International Maritime Bureau. (2008). Piracy and armed robbery against 
ships: Report for the period 1 January–30 September 2008. Available at 
http://www.icc-ccs.org/ (Accessed 26 August 2009). Also see ICC International 
Maritime Bureau. (2009). Piracy and armed robbery against ships annual report, 1 
January-31 December 2008, January. Available at http://www.icc-ccs.org/ 
(Accessed 16 April 2009).  
24 Ibid.  
25 Burgess, D.R. Jr. (2008). Piracy is terrorism. The New York Times, 5 December. 
Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/05/opinion/05burgess.html?_r=1 
(Accessed 19 April 2009). 
26 ICC International Maritime Bureau. (2009). Piracy doubles in first six months of 
2009, 15 July. Available at http://www.icc-ccs.org/ (Accessed 27 August 2009).   
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and, according to the International Maritime Bureau’s report, “violence against crew 
members continues to increase.”27  
Piracy driven by amongst other potential exacerbating factors such as greed and 
grievance has evolved into a well-coordinated and militant threat, extending well 
beyond Somali territorial waters, with far-reaching implications and consequences. 
Somalia’s pirates: Origins, modus operandi and impact 
Various factors have contributed to the mass proliferation of modern-day piracy 
and now the growing potential threat of increased maritime terrorism. There has 
been a significant increase in commercial maritime traffic. Combined with the large 
number of ports around the world, this growth has provided pirates with an almost 
limitless range of tempting, high-payoff targets. There is also a higher incidence of 
seaborne commercial traffic that passes through narrow and congested maritime 
chokepoints. These bottlenecks require ships to reduce speed significantly to ensure 
safe passage, which dramatically heightens their exposure to mid-sea interception 
and attack.28 Maritime surveillance had also been severely constrained with the need 
to invest greater resources and attention to establishing expensive, land-based 
homeland security initiatives, significantly heightened as a result of the devastating 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.29   
Piracy off the coast of Somalia has proliferated at an alarming rate and threatens 
to disrupt international maritime trade drastically. The increased threat of maritime 
piracy has in particular heightened the shipping industry’s financial concerns, in the 
context of the current global economic recession. In May 2008, the advisory Joint 
War Committee of Lloyd’s Market Association placed the Gulf of Aden on its war-
zone list and designated the strategic channel at high risk of “war, strikes, terrorism 
and related perils”.30 Well over 6,8 billion tons of goods are moved by sea annually 
in a global trade cycle worth US$7,4 trillion, with up to 90% of international trade 
travelling by ship at some point. The wave of pirate attacks off the eastern coast of 
Africa has already had a major impact on global shipping patterns and trade routes. 
Following the hijacking of the oil tanker Sirius Star, AP Moller Maersk, Europe’s 
largest shipping company, diverted its fleet of 50 oil tankers away from the Suez 
Canal towards the longer and more expensive route around the Cape of Good 
                                                          
27 Ibid.  
28 Chalk op. cit., p. xi.  
29 Ibid. 
30 Lloyd’s Market Association Joint War Committee. (2009). Joint War Committee – 
Somalia update. Available at http://www.lmalloyds.com  (Accessed 13 August 
2009). 
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Hope.31  The cost of such diversions is of particular concern during spikes in oil 
prices.   
Egypt has been especially affected by reduced maritime traffic primarily caused 
by piracy. Revenue from the Suez Canal is expected to fall from US$5,1 billion in 
FY08 to US$3,6 billion in FY10. This represents a 30% decrease in two years. Suez 
Canal receipts are considered Egypt’s third highest foreign currency earner after 
tourism and remittances.32    
Other cost implications further hamper the achievement of sustainable security 
in this critical trade route. The technology and human resources required to establish 
adequate facilities to secure the Somali coastline could cost between US$750 million 
and US$1,25 billion. At present, Somalia and its neighbours have neither the 
resources nor the skills to implement this strategy, thus further providing lucrative 
incentives for maritime terrorists to exploit this critical security weakness.33  
As Middleton contends, it is also likely that modern-day pirates are plugged into 
an international network that feeds information from ports in the Gulf, Europe and 
Asia back to Somalia. Somali pirates are also allegedly part of “transnational crime 
syndicates” as far afield as Europe, while internal security sources also believe that 
Somali expatriates from Kenya, Djibouti and the United Arab Emirates are 
beneficiaries of vast ransoms being paid out in exchange for the provision of 
sophisticated equipment to facilitate transactions.34 All this, coupled with their use 
of “mother ships”,35 now gives them a greater ability to find and capture potential 
targets. Pirates are no longer simply opportunists; their operations are becoming 
increasingly sophisticated and well coordinated.36 The East African Seafarers’ 
Assistance Programme estimates that presently nearly 1 200 pirates are said to be 
                                                          
31 Biegon, R. (2009). Somali piracy and the international response. Foreign Policy in 
Focus, 29 January. Available at http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/5827 (Accessed 13 
August 2009). 
32 Gilpin, R. (2009). Counting the costs of Somali piracy. United States Institute of 
Peace Working Paper, 22 June. Washington DC: Centre for Sustainable Economies, 
United States Institute of Peace. Available at http://www.usip.org (Accessed 13 
August 2009).  
33 Ibid. p.15 
34 The Associated Press. (2008). Somali piracy backed by international network, 10 
December. Available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/28158455/ (Accessed 19 
August 2009). 
35 Somali pirates operate from small boats that are often launched from a “mother 
vessel” or “mother ship”. Mother vessels allow pirates to attack and hijack passing 
ships further off the coast as well as during bad weather.   
36 Middleton op. cit., p. 6. 
 53 
active off the coastline of Somalia, making it increasingly difficult to curb attacks 
effectively.37  
Puntland, the semi-autonomous region in the northeast of the country, appears to 
be the base for most pirates in Somalia. Traditionally, most pirates, including the 
infamous Afweyne, originate from Harardheere (Xaradheere) and Hobyo in Central 
Somalia (see attached map). The small village of Eyl and others right up to the tip of 
Somalia has played host to many recently hijacked ships. The pirates have generally 
taken captured vessels to small ports such as Eyl and ships are held there until 
ransom has been paid. This particular town has been deemed a safe haven and hub 
for Somalia’s lucrative piracy industry (ransom payments range between 
US$500 000 and US$2 million and, according to estimates, total ransom payments 
for 2008 were in the range of between US$18–US$30 million).38 Many of the pirates 
are also part of the same clan – the so-called “Majarteen” – and the clan of 
Somalia’s former President Abdullahi Yusuf, who also hails from the Puntland 
region.39  
Four known pirate gangs operate in Somalia. They include the National 
Volunteer Coast Guard, operating around Kismayo, the Marka Group, operating 
south of Mogadishu and the Puntland Group, operating around Puntland. The 
Somali Marines (or “Defenders of Somali Territorial Waters” as they prefer to be 
known) are considered the most powerful pirate group, who has a military structure 
and partake in kidnapping and ransom operations with the use of so-called “mother 
ships”. Their area of operation includes central Somalia from north of Mogadishu 
towards Puntland.40 
Poverty and unemployment are rife in Somalia and approximately two-thirds of 
Somali youth are unemployed.41 The combination of inter-clan rivalry, corruption, 
                                                          
37 Bergen Risk Solutions. (2009). Gulf of Aden piracy: Background forecast, 
practical prevention strategies. Available at http://www.bergenrisksolutions.com 
(Accessed 17 April 2009). 
38 Ibid., p. 16.  
39 Harper, M. (2008). Life in Somalia’s pirate town. BBC News, 18 September. 
Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/africa/7623329.stm (Accessed 16 
April 2009).  
40 Bergen Risk Solutions op. cit., p. 17. 
41 Somali pirates are generally young (late teens to early 30s). The vast majority of 
these youths are poorly educated, unemployed and disaffected. Interestingly, this 
profile could also be applied to recruits of terrorist organisations.  
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arms proliferation, extremism and pervasive impunity has provided a facilitating 
environment in which criminality has flourished.42  
With little functioning governance, long, isolated, sandy beaches and a 
population that is both desperate and sensitised to the presence of war, Somalia has 
provided an ideal environment in which piracy has been able to thrive – and, given 
the changing nature of the threat – to evolve in its own right as intimately part of the 
problem, and not merely as a symptom of the failed Somali state. Over the past few 
years, the growing ascendancy of the threat posed by Islamic militancy could add an 
additional troubling dimension to the crisis off the Somali coast.  
The rising tide of Islamic extremism  
The US, given its disastrous and failed intervention in Somalia in 1993, has in 
particular repeatedly expressed fears and concerns that Somalia could become a 
renewed safe haven in which Al-Qaeda could thrive and gain a considerable 
stronghold.   
In its National Strategy for Combating Terrorism of 2006, the US stresses that: 
We will continue to prevent terrorists from exploiting ungoverned or 
under-governed areas as safe havens – secure spaces that allow our 
enemies to plan, organize, train, and prepare for operations. Ultimately, 
we will eliminate these havens altogether.43 
A virulent anti-Americanism had taken hold in Somalia since 2006. The US had 
attempted to create an alliance of clan militia leaders to capture a number of foreign 
Al-Qaeda operatives believed to be in Mogadishu as guests of the hard-line Somali 
Islamists. The Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism 
(ARPCT) clashed with local Islamists and within months was decisively defeated by 
the Union of Islamic Courts (ICU).44 This paved the way for the rise of the ICU, 
which came to govern Mogadishu and parts of south-central Somalia for seven 
months, restoring some semblances of order. Radical elements within the ICU 
however threatened stability, declaring jihad against Ethiopia and culminated in the 
                                                          
42 Gilpin op. cit., p. 1. 
43 United States of America. (2006). National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, 
September. Available at http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/nsct2006.pdf (Accessed 28 
August 2009).  
44 Menkhaus, K. (2008). Somalia: A country in peril, a policy nightmare. ENOUGH 
Strategy Paper, September. Available at http://www.enoughproject.org (Accessed 22 
April 2009).  
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US-backed military offensive by Ethiopia, ousting the ICU. The Ethiopian military 
marched into Mogadishu unopposed, setting the stage for further catastrophe and 
conflict.45  
In response, a complex insurgency in early 2007 emerged, involving the Al-
Shabaab, clan militias and other armed groups targeting the Transitional Federal 
Government (TFG) and the Ethiopian military, giving rise to several brutal attacks 
and suicide bombings.  
As early as January 2007, the US embarked on adopting a decisive military 
approach to eliminate the threat of a possible Al-Qaeda presence in Somalia, when a 
US Air Force AC-130 gunship attacked suspected Al-Qaeda members in southern 
Somalia, the first acknowledged operation of this nature since US withdrawal in 
1993.46 In March 2008, the US undertook further determined action by designating 
the Al-Shabaab, a terrorist organisation and in May 2008 carried out a missile strike 
on a safe house in central Somalia that killed a key leader of the Al-Shabaab, Aden 
Hashi Ayro.47 Furthermore, US Special Forces succeeded in mid-September 2009 in 
killing another top Al-Qaeda commander, Saleh Ali Nabhan, a well-known figure in 
Somalia’s Al-Shabaab, involved in the bombings of US Embassies in Kenya and 
Tanzania in 1998 and the attacks on a hotel and Israeli airliner in Mombasa, Kenya 
in 2002.48 Amidst the rising threat of extremism on land, growing concern is now 
being expressed of the possible alliance between pirates and terrorists in Somalia.  
The proliferating threat of the piracy-terrorism nexus in Somalia  
Complicating the maritime threat picture is growing perception that a tactical 
nexus could emerge between piracy and terrorism. One of the main concerns is that 
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extremist groups will seek to overcome existing operational constraints in sea-based 
capabilities by working in conjunction with or subcontracting out missions to 
maritime crime gangs and syndicates.49 There is therefore no escaping the 
uncomfortable possibility that piracy could soon evolve into acts of maritime 
terrorism in Somalia and could include motivations that extend well beyond the 
economic to increasingly include securing lucrative and prestigious “political 
profit”. In many respects, piracy could provide lucrative support in other ways, short 
of actual engagement in acts of terrorism, such as in the form of financial assistance 
to fund the insurgency on land.  
The potential for “jihad” on the open seas 
Growing concerns about the risks posed by maritime terrorism are 
fundamentally based not on the experience of past attacks, but rather on increased 
recognition of unexploited vulnerabilities, allegedly shifting intentions and 
capabilities among terrorist groups, and the potential for risk-transformation effects 
as terrorist groups respond to increased vigilance and security measures on land.50 
In June 2006, a new online magazine for actual and aspiring global jihadis and 
their supporters, Sada al-Jihad (“Echo of Jihad”), which took the place of Sawt al-
Jihad (“Voice of Jihad”) as the publication of Al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia, featured an 
article by one Abu Azzam al-Ansari entitled “Al-Qaeda is Moving to Africa”.51 Abu 
Azzam was remarkably frank in his assessment: 
There is no doubt that Al-Qaeda and the holy warriors appreciate the 
significance of the African regions for the military campaigns against the 
Crusaders. Many people sense that this continent has not yet found its 
proper and expected role and the next stages of the conflict will see 
Africa as the battlefield … Africa is a fertile soil for the advance of jihad 
and the jihadi cause. 
Islamic extremist forums and jihadi media have also been promoting and 
threatening to perpetrate naval terrorism as an important strategic trend in the jihadi 
path. Jihad Press, an e-journal affiliated with Al-Qaeda, allegedly issued a statement 
entitled “Naval Terrorism, a Strategic Necessity”, which was carried by several 
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different jihadi forums in 2008.52 Similar to jihadi ground formations, the maritime 
mujahideen “must commence marine training programs to prepare naval units 
capable of controlling the sea and restoring the Islamic caliphate”. According to the 
author of the article, the mujahideen should start the naval jihad operations along the 
Yemeni coastal area because it is the junction for the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of 
Aden, commanding as well the Red Sea and the Mandab Strait opening into the 
Indian Ocean. In this context, the probability for notions of “naval jihad” to be 
realised and executed in the near future off the Somali coast is rapidly proliferating 
and Somali pirates provide an ideal vehicle through which the wider jihad on land 
could be significantly bolstered and even accelerated.  
The terrorist threat in Somalia could therefore be expanded to include greater 
command of the open seas, if both local and internationally linked extremists seize 
and act upon this enticing opportunity. There is also growing evidence that battle-
hardened extremists are filtering out of safe havens along the Pakistan-Afghanistan 
border and into East Africa. According to US military and counterterrorism officials, 
there is concern that Somalia is increasingly on a path to become the next 
Afghanistan, a sanctuary where Al-Qaeda-linked groups could train and plan 
attacks.53  
Authorities also confirmed the first case of alleged Pakistani involvement with 
Somali pirates when a Russian warship apprehended 12 Pakistani nationals, along 
with Somali pirates for attempting to attack a tanker off the coast of Somalia on 28 
April 2009. The Russian warship, Admiral Panteleyev, found that the pirates’ 
speedboats were being guided from another mother vessel, a captured Iranian 
trawler with six Iranian hostages, captained by Mohammed Zamal, a Pakistani 
national, who was communicating with pirates via satellite phone. This has raised 
the spectre of a potential future pirate-extremist alliance even further.54 This poses 
major challenges to the new Somali administration.  
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In January 2009, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, former chairman of the moderate 
wing of the Union of Islamic Courts, was elected President of Somalia. The Union 
of Islamic Courts has emerged into one of Somalia’s strongest fighting forces. Some 
argue these courts are the most popular political force in the country. The Union 
does contain radical elements however and two of the 11 courts are seen as militant. 
One is led by Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys and is on the US list of terrorism suspects 
due to his formal leadership role in al-Itihaad al-Islamiya, which was linked to Al-
Qaeda.55 The newly elected President has however emerged as a pivotal moderate 
force, calling on all Somalis to embrace peace and closer ties with the international 
community, including the US. This call has been undermined by the growing 
proliferation of a new and menacing threat – the Al-Shabaab.  
The rise of Al-Shabaab 
The Al-Shabaab (“The Youth”), allegedly founded as early as 2004 and 
suspected to be an Al-Qaeda-affiliated organisation, is considered the most militant, 
well-organised, well-financed and most active group in Somalia.56 It has 
energetically conducted an extensive military, political and propaganda campaign 
aimed at recapturing the south of the country.57 Al-Shabaab sees the struggle with its 
adversaries as essentially ideological. Various Somali jihadi websites (mainly hosted 
in Europe and North America) have emerged, promoting a new militant ideology, 
which sees “pure” Muslims as being in a permanent state of war with “infidels”.58 
Al-Shabaab has successfully re-established Islamist control in many parts of 
southern and central Somalia in recent months. Many of the most recent, violent and 
brutal attacks are attributed to the group, who are now believed to number 7 000 
fighters.59 Their growing strength and continuing success could perhaps foreshadow 
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the violent overthrow of the incumbent Somali regime and the ascendancy of a 
“Taliban-style” hostile takeover.  
Al-Shabaab’s leadership is closely linked to Al-Qaeda and has attempted to 
portray Somalia as a central theatre in the jihadist movement, although it is still 
considered to be very much a secondary node for operations.60 Many in the current 
leadership cadre are also said to be graduates of Al-Qaeda training camps. Al 
Shabaab leader Ibrahim Haji Jama trained with Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan (his nom 
de guerre in Somalia is al-Afghani). Another leader, Abu Taha al-Sudani, known 
also as Tariq Abdullah, was Al-Qaeda's leader in East Africa and is believed to be 
the main financier of its African operations.61 Veteran Al-Qaeda terrorists are also 
said to form part of Al-Shabaab’s ranks. They include Fazul Abdullah Muhammad, 
a former member of Osama bin Laden's Nairobi base who is wanted by the US – a 
US$5 million FBI bounty is on his head – for his involvement in the 1998 East 
African embassy bombings.  
Al-Shabaab’s goal is to have Sharia as the permanent law of Somalia, the 
creation of an Islamic state and to get the infidels out of the country, whether they 
are Ethiopians or Americans. At the beginning of February 2009, Al-Qaeda’s 
second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri, in an audio recording entitled “From 
Kabul to Mogadishu”, praised “important developments” in Somalia (which 
included Al-Shabaab fighters seizing control of Baidoa, where the transitional 
government had been based), which al-Zawahiri called “a step on the path of victory 
of Islam”.62 
At the behest of Osama bin Laden and Ethiopia’s withdrawal, foreign jihadists 
were said to have flocked to Somalia, joining forces with local fighters to turn the 
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country into a renewed safe haven for Al-Qaeda.63 At the time of writing, Somalia 
was said to be providing shelter to approximately 450 fighters who were working 
with the Al-Shabaab, the hard-line Islamist group that had been spearheading a 
bloody insurgency since 2006 and were designated a terrorist organisation by the US 
State Department. Foreign jihadists are originating from countries such as the United 
States, Europe, the Middle East and Asia, entering the country on regular airlines 
from the northern semi-autonomous state of Somaliland. Most of the fighters are 
said to be concentrated in Garowe, in the northern breakaway state of Puntland, and 
the southern towns of Baidoa, Merka and Kismayo (a strategic port town).  
Al-Shabaab’s strength, reach and operational capabilities may be grossly 
underestimated. At the end of September 2009 Al-Shabaab released a 48-minute 
video documentary in which the organisation proclaimed its allegiance to Osama bin 
Laden. The documentary entitled ‘Labaik ya Osama’ (At your service, Osama), was 
released for the Eid al-Fitr feast marking the end of the holy Muslim fasting month 
of Ramadan.64 
Given that Al-Shabaab has now made known its closer allegiance to Al-Qaeda, 
the infiltration of pirate gangs by hard-line terrorists could be undertaken with 
relative ease. Working alongside pirate gangs will also provide the Al-Shabaab with 
renewed access to critical financial infrastructure, which had been severed by the 
West. The radical Al-Shabaab insurgents are believed to be directly linked with the 
pirates, as their activities have increased parallel with the piracy.65 There is already 
concern that strategic sections of the Somali coastline may already be under the 
control of radical Islamists.  
A dual jihad? 
If an alliance between Somali pirates and terrorists is successfully forged (if it 
does not already exist), the threat posed to merchant vessels and tourist cruise liners 
is considerably greater. Many believe this alliance is already transpiring.  
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In mid-April 2009, in perhaps the clearest indication yet of an impending 
strengthening piracy-terror alliance, a senior Saudi Arabian Al-Qaeda operative, 
Sa’id Ali Jabir Al Khathim Al Shihri (a.k.a. Abu Sufian al-Azdi) called on Somali 
jihadists to step up their attacks on “crusader” forces at sea in the pirate-infested 
Gulf of Aden, and on land in neighbouring Djibouti:  
To our steadfast brethren in Somalia, take caution and prepare 
yourselves. Increase your strikes against the crusaders at sea and in 
Djibouti. The crusaders, the Jews and the traitorous rulers did not come 
to the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Aden except to wage war against you 
in Somalia and abolish your newly established emirate, and by Allah, 
they shall be defeated. They shall bring a curse upon their people. We 
shall not leave them this time until we get to their own countries with the 
help of Allah.66  
The East African Seafarers’ Assistance Programme has also highlighted that the 
rapid proliferation of piracy could also be instrumental in funding the growing 
Somali insurgency onshore as the hijackers could be funnelling hefty ransom 
payments to Islamist rebels.67 The Islamists have built sophisticated and secretive 
methods of fundraising and transfer, which are difficult for outsiders to penetrate. It 
is clear that they have plenty of funds, which they use to buy arms and to recruit.68 
Originally, piracy itself was regarded as apolitical; carried out for financial gain void 
of political motivation beyond the direct act of hijacking or attacking a maritime 
target. However, since the late 1990s, Somali piracy has dramatically increased and 
attracted rebel groups who have joined piracy in order to generate additional 
revenues for war-fighting.69 Moreover, although data is scarce, it has been reported 
that money from piracy ransoms has helped pay for the war in Somalia, including 
funds to the Al-Shabaab. The Al-Shabaab also allegedly have а certain degree of 
control over several pirate groups, and are said to be providing operating funds and 
                                                          
66 Wassef, K. (2009). Al-Qaeda urges Somalis to attack ships. CBS News, 16 April. 
Available at   
http://www.cbsnews.com/blogs/2009/04/16/world/worldwatch/entry4949488.shtml 
(Accessed 22 April 2009).  
67 Wallis, D. (2008). Piracy ransoms funding Somalia insurgency. Reuters, 24 
August. Available at http://www.reuters.com/article/reutersEdge/ 
idUSLO00572320080824 (Accessed 26 August 2009).  
68 International Crisis Group op. cit., p. 15. 
69 Tsvetkova, B. (2008). Securitizing piracy off the coast of Somalia. Central 
European Journal of International and Security Studies, 3(1). Available at 
http://www.cejiss.org/articles/vol3-1/tsvetkova/ (Accessed 29 August 2009).   
 62 
specialist weapons in return for a share of ransoms. It is reported that about 2 500 
Somali youth have been trained by the Al-Shabaab in cities along the Somali coast.70 
Therefore, despite random dismissals by staunch critics of a possible link 
between Somali pirates and extremists, some plausible evidence exists that a link 
between piracy and the thriving insurgency on land could be a possibility through 
the waging of two distinct, but intimately connected forms of jihad.  
Raymond Ibrahim provides plausible evidence worth considering to this effect:  
During the recent Somali pirate standoff with U.S. forces, when 
American sea captain Richard Phillips was being held hostage, Fox 
News analyst Charles Krauthammer confidently concluded, “The good 
news is that these [pirates] are not jihadists. If it’s a jihadist holding a 
hostage, there is going to be a lot of death. These guys are interested not 
in martyrdom but in money.” In fact, the only good news is that Richard 
Phillips has been rescued. The bad news is that what appears to have 
been a bunch of lawless, plunder-seeking Somalis “yo-hoing” on the 
high seas may well in fact be related to the jihad – as attested to by both 
Islamic history and doctrine.71 
The definition of jihad in Islam, is not confined merely to waging war with arms, 
but includes several other aspects of support for “holy war”. Amongst the various 
forms identified, Islamic scholars also refer to Al-Jihad bi-al-Mal, Financial Jihad: 
fundraising for needy Muslims and supporting the jihad warriors – the mujahideen. 
Financial jihad is therefore seen as a vital means for the mujahideen in financing 
their military activity, such as the acquisition of weapons.72 In January 2009, for 
instance a tape-recorded message, allegedly from Osama bin Laden called on 
Muslims to donate money to support the global jihad. In another 11-minute audio 
recording in March 2009, Osama bin Laden hailed the fighters engaged in the 
ongoing insurgency spearheaded by Al-Shabaab as: 
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… my brothers the Mujahideen, the honest sons of Somalia, who are one 
of the most important armies in the Mujahid Islamic battalion, and are 
the first line of defense for the Islamic world in its southwest part …”73 
Bin Laden called upon Somalis to rally around the fighters and for Muslims 
elsewhere to:  
… extend a helping hand to our family in Somalia, to meet the needs of 
those afflicted by famine, and to also expend their energies and wealth to 
back the Jihad [there] until [the country] is liberated from invaders and 
hypocrites and the state of Islam is set up in it.74 
Therefore, the vast sums of ransom that had thus far being accumulated through 
acts of piracy off the coast of Somalia are an invaluable source that could be 
providing vital funding to sustain the insurgency. As London75 therefore contends, 
the threat of Muslim piracy as a form of jihad is not a new phenomenon, but due to 
military disadvantage has shifted the institution of Muslim piracy from being 
primarily about Al-jihad fil-bahr, or the holy war at sea, to the more rewarding 
notion of Al-jihad bi-al-Mal, the financial holy war.76  
Similarly, as Ibrahim contends, Islamic law (Sharia), what mainland Somali 
Islamists have been waging a jihad to implement, has much to say about kidnapping, 
ransom demands, and slavery. According to Sharia, there are only four ways to deal 
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with infidel hostages, namely execution, enslavement, exchange for Muslim 
prisoners, or exchange for ransom.77 In one instance, Somali insurgents demanded a 
US$2,5 million ransom for the release of Canadian journalist Amanda Lindhout, 
who was also abducted and allegedly raped by Somali Islamists. In July 2009, two 
French agents were also abducted by the Al-Shabaab and are to be tried under Sharia 
law on charges of espionage and entering Somalia “to assist the enemy of Allah”. 
According to Somali officials, the agents may have been held in return for the 
freedom of some Somali pirates currently jailed in France. According to the Social 
Affairs Ministry, some Al-Shabaab members have relatives imprisoned in France-
who are said to be Somali pirates.78  
Other scholars contend that Somali pirates are also strategically different from 
their historical predecessors in the Caribbean or their contemporary colleagues in 
archipelagoes around the world and could possibly be part of a far wider regional 
jihadi apparatus being deployed in the Horn of Africa.79 Another argument worth 
considering in the possible closer relationship and connection between pirates and 
extremists is that Somali pirates do not necessarily think of themselves as pirates, 
but instead consider themselves devout Muslims protecting Somalia against the 
infidel West, such as one pirate proclaimed in an interview with Reuters, “we are 
Muslims, we are marines, coast guards – not pirates.”80  
Judging from the praises of Sheikh Mukhtar Robow (“Abu Mansur”), 
spokesman for the Al-Shabaab, praising Somalia’s pirates for “protecting the coast 
against the enemies of Allah” and Sheikh Hassan Abdullah Hersi al-Turki, leader of 
the Al-Shabaab-linked Mu’askar Ras Kamboni who regarded the pirates “as part of 
the mujahedeen because they are in a war with Christian countries who want to 
misuse the Somali coast”.81 Extremists consider these groups’ actions as 
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instrumental in the wider jihad against the West and will likely seek to forge closer 
relations to broaden and strengthen operations on both land and sea in the near 
future. While it is not apparent that pirates are selective in their targets, if a closer 
alliance is forged with extremists, this could become a contentious issue. In 2008, 
for instance hard-line Islamist fighters stormed the port town of Xarardheere, where 
Somali pirates were holding the Saudi Arabian-owned supertanker, the Sirius Star. 
The Al-Shabaab planned to free the ship stressing, “Saudi Arabia is a Muslim 
country and hijacking its ship is a bigger crime than other ships.”82  
At Al-Jihad Fil-Bahr’s edge?: the looming anarchy at sea  
In conclusion, it is important to note that Somali piracy has not yet resulted in 
major incidents of suicide terrorism or major casualties as a result of attacks carried 
out by pirates. Pirates have also not yet openly engaged in full-scale terror 
operations either. Following the Maersk Alabama incident, Somali pirates however 
vowed revenge and warned that in future operations they would execute French and 
US sailors.83 There is also growing concern that hostages could be summarily 
executed in acts of desperation by pirates confronted by naval powers. In a further 
act of vengeance, the Al-Shabaab fired mortars toward US Congressman Donald 
Payne’s airplane, as he left Somalia, following a mid-April 2009 visit to discuss the 
continuing threat of piracy.84  
Somali piracy is no longer a mere symptom of the anarchy that has reigned in 
the Somali state. The security vacuum and ungoverned spaces of the failed state’s 
perilous coastline are now ruled by increasingly desperate and dangerous pirates 
who could in future resort to increasingly futile acts of maritime terrorism to inflict 
even greater damage against Western interests. Pirates have also proved highly 
resilient to changes in the strategic environment and have not been intimidated by 
the international naval force presently patrolling the vast coastline. Should an 
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alliance between Somali piracy and Somali Islamist terrorism transpire and be 
allowed to mature to achieve operational and strategic synergies, the consequences 
would be catastrophic.85 This is a clear and present danger, which could prove 
difficult to combat and which would be almost impossible to prevent (given the 
ever-proliferating anarchy presently being witnessed in Somalia) and therefore poses 
a threat to the continued and unhindered use of the world’s oceans for exclusively 
peaceful purposes.   
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